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Plaintiff-Appellee Parker M. Nielson ("Petitioner" or 
"Nielson" herein) petitions the Court for rehearing (reconsider-
ation) of the Opinion filed herein on November 21, 1994 ("Slip 
Opinion" herein), pursuant to the provisions of Rule 35, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
POINTS OF LAW OR FACT OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED 
Petitioner submits that the following issues of law or fact 
were overlooked or misapprehended: 
1. Portions of the record not trans-
mitted to this Court establish that Notice of 
Claim was mailed to the Attorney General on 
August 14, 1991, thus complying with the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
2. Provisions of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act "excepting" claims against a state 
employee based on fraud or malice from its 
provisions were overlooked. 
3. Utah law exempting equitable claims 
from the requirement of Notice of Claim 
pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
was overlooked or misapprehended. 
4. Ruling that premature notice of appeal 
takes effect on entry of final judgment, 
pursuant to Rule 4(c), overlooks or 
misapprehends that notice of appeal was 
jurisdictionally defective under Rule 3(d) 
because the premature notice did not designate 
the final judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Partial Summary Judgment was entered by the Honorable David S. 
Young on June 24, 1991. The Honorable Richard H. Moffat then ruled 
that Defendant-Appellants Affidavit claiming conduct pursuant to 
peace officer authority was "riddled with untruths." A proposed 
Amended Complaint was served on the Attorney General on August 14, 
1991, and was subsequently filed as a new complaint seeking 
injunctive relief. 
The two actions, denominated herein as No. 3 02 (the original 
conversion/interference with contract claim) and No. 249 (the 
claim for injunctive relief), respectively, were consolidated. 
The two consolidated proceedings went to trial, on the merits, 
before the Honorable David S. Young, District Judge, sitting 
without a jury, who found in a Memorandum Decision at R. 1908-1915 
that Gurley was guilty of willful, malicious, and knowingly 
reckless misconduct and enjoined Gurley individually from such 
conduct. (Findings ff 6-11, R. 1951-1949.) 
Final judgment was entered on January 7, 1993 (R. 1955). This 
Court reversed in the Slip Opinion filed November 21, 1994, 
holding that Nielson had not filed a timely Notice of Claim with 
the Attorney General and that untimely Notice of Appeal was not 
jurisdictionally defective. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The pertinent facts are stated at Slip Op. 1-2, a copy of 
which is attached and which statement is adopted herein. All 
references herein to the Record ("R") are to No. 302, unless 
otherwise indicated. 
Additional facts determined by the trial judge pertinent 
herein and not disturbed by the Slip Opinion include that Nielson 
was known to Gurley since at least 1986. (Finding C, R. 326.) 
Prior to the acts alleged, Gurley knew of the activities of 
Nielson and other dog trainers on the subject lands, and had 
openly expressed his hostility and dislike for their sport. 
Gurley also knew that his predetermined opinions were improper, 
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August 14, 1991. This Court having held that notice was adequate 
if given prior to September 8, 1991, the holding that notice was 
not given to the Attorney General must therefore be vacated. 
This Court erred, moreover, at Slip Op. 9, by misconstruing 
and misapplying Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(3)(b) (1993). That code 
section had not been enacted and has no bearing on Nielson's 
claims filed in 1990. Its precursor, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(3) 
(1990), was differently worded and excepted claims against an 
employee of the State based upon fraud or malice from the 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
The holding that the premature notice of appeal was effective 
to confer jurisdiction on this appeal must also be vacated, for 
the Slip Opinion overlooked the jurisdictional requirements at 
Rule 3(d), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
POINT I 
NIELSON'S PLAIN AND ADMITTED NOTICE OF CLAIM 
WAS NOT TRANSMITTED TO THIS COURT AND WAS 
APPARENTLY OVERLOOKED 
Even if we accept that the Complaint alleged conduct "under 
color of the state's authority,/ (Slip Op. 7) , and disregard that 
the trial judge found otherwise, and that the waiver provisions 
concerning contracts and/or malice do not apply to a state 
employee (Slip Op. 9), (which we do only arguendo and for 
purposes of this Point), this Court nevertheless overlooked, 
because it was not available to it, the clear record in concluding 
at Slip Op. 10-11 that there was no evidence of notice to the 
Attorney General on August 14, 1991. Equally in error was the 
holding that "it was not until December 4, 1991, that Nielson sent 
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notice of the claim to the Attorney General." Both errors 
apparently resulted because the Clerk of the District Court in 
Tooele did not transmit the Record in No. 249 to this Court. The 
holding is patent error for the additional reason that the notice 
of December 4, 1991, did not even relate to this action. 
The footnote to the foregoing holding acknowledges (1) that 
notice would be effective if it was by September 8, 1991, and (2) 
"that Nielson timely served notice of claim on Gurley and DWR." 
The footnote further concedes, correctly, that the Notice of Claim 
would be adequate if the Record established that it was also sent 
to the Attorney General, but incorrectly states that "Nielson can 
point to nothing in the record to support this claim [that it was 
sent to the Attorney General on August 14, 1991]." The proof of 
service on the Attorney General is in fact part of the Record and 
appears at p. 2202 of the Record in No. 249. 
Rule 11(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires the 
Appellant to see that the entire Record is filed. We had no 
knowledge that the Record was incomplete prior to this Court's 
ruling. We have nevertheless requested the Clerk of the Tooele 
Court to transmit that portion of the Record so that this Court 
may be properly advised. 
In point of fact, copies of the proof of service in No. 249 
can also be found in the Record of No. 302. R. 342-343 and R. 
346-347 contain not one, but two, copies of the proof of service, 
plainly showing that the proposed new Complaint was served on the 
Attorney General on August 14, 1991. The Amended Complaint was 
never filed in No. 3 02 because Judge Moffat determined that it was 
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premature. After ninety days had expired, the exact Complaint, 
notice of which had been served in No. 3 02, was filed as a new 
Complaint, assigned Docket No. 249 (Record in No. 249 at 
2088-2230), and consolidated with 302. 
There can be no doubt, under those circumstances, that the 
Attorney General had written notice of Nielson7s claim. The 
Record is replete with proof in that regard. No form is specified 
for the notice. It need only (1) include a brief statement of the 
facts, (2) the nature of the claim, (3) state damages, (4) be in 
writing, (5) signed and (6) also be directed to the responsible 
agency. See Utah Code Ann § 63-30-11(3) (1993). Better notice 
could not be supplied than the actual Complaint that was to be 
filed. 
There can be no doubt, either, that if the trial court had 
dismissed Nielson7s first suit, on a timely motion asserting that 
notice of claim had not been given [which motion Watkiss & 
Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991) holds was waived 
by failure to file it before summary judgment], Nielson could have 
filed a new complaint after giving notice. He could also do so, 
after giving notice, in anticipation that the first suit might 
be dismissed. 
Most telling and conclusive with respect to notice, this Court 
has overlooked or misapprehended that the Attorney General (as 
distinguished from Gurley or his present counsel) never disputed 
having notice. We showed the Court at footnote 1 of Brief of 
Appellant on pp. 7-8 that the Complaint in the second action 
alleged at If 38 notice to the Attorney General by serving the 
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proposed Complaint on the Attorney General on August 14, 1991, and 
giving the Division of Wildlife Resources notice on September 3, 
1991. Gurley's answer, filed for him by the Attorney General, 
admitted that "the documents referred to in paragraph 38 of 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint were filed on or about the dates 
alleged by Plaintiff. . . ." (R. 1725; Record in No. 249, 2271). 
We have never understood that it is necessary to prove matters 
that are admitted in the pleadings. 
Questioning notice by Gurley's new counsel, in face of those 
facts, is a "red herring," which was calculated by Gurley to (and 
did) mislead this Court. There really can be no doubt that Gurley 
and the Attorney General had sufficient notice of Nielson's claims 
for the foregoing purposes, from their inception. The Attorney 
General even defended Nielson's claims against Gurley, directly, 
until outside counsel was engaged following entry of summary judg-
ment. We recognize and acknowledge that the original Complaint 
cannot be its own notice for purposes of the Governmental Immunity 
Act, both because it was not served on the Attorney General ninety 
days before the Complaint was filed and because it did not also 
afford notice to DWR, but it can, and did, afford notice for 
purposes of the second suit. The only legitimate questions 
concerning notice, therefore, are (1) whether notice was also 
given to the agency, (2) the second Complaint was filed three 
months thereafter and (3) within one year after September 3, 
1990. Those conditions were met, No. 249 being filed on December 
30, 1991, and Slip Op. 11 conceding that notice was given to the 
Division of Wildlife Resources prior to September 8, 1991. 
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The proposed Amended Complaint served on August 14, 1991 
provided a second notice to the Attorney General, Notice, 
therefore, was not only supplied, it was redundant to the point of 
rendering its denial by Gurley an absurdity. 
Finally, this Court's statement at Slip Op. 11 n.6 that 
"Nielson . . . readily admits that . . . he anticipate[d] that the 
. . . first and second notices were defective" is incorrect, 
has no basis in the Record, and should be corrected in the 
interest of fairness and integrity. Brief of Appellee p.7 n.l 
makes no such admission. It says only that "as a matter of 
caution, and anticipating that the Attorney General would 
contend that the first and second notices were defective" a third 
notice was filed. 
It was never conceded that Nielson anticipated that notice 
was defective. Knowing that the Attorney General was pursuing the 
strictisimi juris game, Nielson merely deemed it prudent to "cut 
them off at the pass," including with respect to his anticipated 
civil rights action, by jumping through each hoop when and as 
contrived. That is merely careful lawyering and in no sense an 
admission that notice was defective. To borrow a phrase from the 
trial judge, the State may not "play an ignoble role," by ignoring 
plain written notice of intent to sue. 
*We are perhaps, responsible for the Court's misunderstanding 
in that regard, for we failed to explain that the third notice, 
which appears at Record 2 096-2106 in No. 249, relates to a 
proposed civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based upon 
the false Affidavit claiming peace officer conduct. It was not a 
Notice of Claim concerning Gurley's conduct on September 8, 1990. 
It could not indicate that notices herein were defective, and this 
Court is mistaken to state otherwise. The mistake, again, is 
understandable, for this Court did not have the Record in No. 249 
and could not examine the Notice and apprise itself of those facts. 
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POINT II 
EQUITABLE CLAIMS ARE EXEMPT FROM 
THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT 
The Slip Opinion ignores that the second Complaint in No, 249 
was filed specifically in response to Gurley's claims, after 
summary judgment had already been entered, that he acted in a 
peace officer capacity. Its purpose was to add a claim for 
injunctive relief. The Utah Supreme Court was clear in American 
Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 
1992) that 
[t]his court has long recognized a common law 
exception to governmental immunity for equitable 
claims. Neither the passage of time nor the 
enactment of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
has eroded this exception. (Citations omitted.) 
Being a lawyer, Nielson knew that even if a peace officer 
could not be sued for damages, he could be enjoined from wrongful 
conduct. The trial judge was similarly aware and granted 
injunctive relief. 
We are, therefore, candidly, dismayed at the Court's assertion 
at Slip Op. 7 that "Nielson was aware, even from the initial 
stages of this litigation, that Gurley claimed to have seized his 
property under color of the State's authority." Nothing in the 
Record indicates that Nielson saw Gurley in the act of destroying 
his property, saw him in uniform or in a state vehicle. The 
Record establishes that Nielson knew the history of Gurley's 
animosity, found as a fact by the trial judge, and that acts of 
malice were not within peace officer authority. Surely the Court 
cannot mean that suit could not be filed on known facts or legal 
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principles or that a lawyer is obligated to disregard facts and 
law known to him. Moreover, all of the matters alluded to at note 
4, Slip Op. 7, were falsifications by Gurley, as determined by 
Judge Moffat, for the purposes of fabricating an appearance of 
peace officer conduct after he had already been served with 
process. Those matters did not come to light for many months, and 
could not afford notice of pecice officer claims at the time the 
Complaint was filed. 
The Supreme Court has held, to the contrary, that "the 
district court erred in holding that [the attorney's] knowledge of 
the two other cases, both of which he personally particated in, 
was irrelevant to the issue of whether he made a reasonable 
inquiry into the law." Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah, 
1992) This Court has held, to the same effect, in Jeschke v. 
Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 204 (Utah App. 1991), that sanctions 
against former Attorney General Robert Hansen were proper because 
of knowledge available to him. Is Nielson then required to 
ignore facts, well known to him, of Gurley7s malice? Is he to 
ignore his knowledge of requirements of the law that a wildlife 
officer make reasonable inquiry before destroying a bird pen, and 
assume that conduct in disregard of that requirement was within 
peace officer authority? 
Point III 
HOLDING THAT NOTICE IS REQUIRED 
ON CLAIMS ALLEGING "MALICE" 
IS CONTRARY TO STATUTE AND SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
The holding at Slip Op. 9, that Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(3)(b) 
(1993) means only that "if the employee acted or failed to act 
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through malice or fraud, the employee cannot successfully invoke 
governmental immunity as an affirmative defense" is in error. The 
section cited by this Court was not in effect when Nielson 
initiated the instant suit on September 18, 1990. The 1983 
version of the Act, which was in effect when Nielson7s suit was 
initiated, was worded differently. See § 63-30-4(3) (1990): 
(3) The remedy against a governmental entity 
or its employee for an injury caused by an act 
or omission which occurs during the performance 
of such employee's duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority is, 
after the effective date of this act, exclusive 
of any other civil action or proceeding by 
reason of the same subject matter against the 
employee or the state or the employee whose act 
or omission gave rise to the claim unless the 
employee acted or failed to act through fraud 
or malice. (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the 1983 version of § 63-30-4(3) provided, contrary to the 
conclusion of the Slip Opinion herein, that proceedings under the 
Governmental Immunity Act were not the exclusive remedy in cases 
involving fraud or malice. 
Reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(3) (b) (1993) overlooked, 
or misapprehended, that the same "exception," albeit differently 
worded, is now contained in § 63-30-4(3)(a): 
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), 
an action under this chapter against a govern-
mental entity or its employee for an injury 
caused by an act or omission that occurs during 
the performance of the employee's duties, within 
the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority is a plaintiff's exclusive remedy. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Subsection (b) refers to fraud/malice, which subsection (a) 
clearly states is an "exception" to the requirement of proceeding 
under the Governmental Immunity Act. Contrary to this Court's 
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conclusion, the purpose of the exception is not "to insulate the 
sovereign from liability" (Slip Op. 9) , but to afford redress 
outside of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
The exact reverse of this Court's conclusion that "the notice 
requirements would be meaningless because the substantive 
provisions of sovereign immunity would fully protect the sovereign 
and its operatives in any event" is true. This Court's holding 
would have the effect of nullifying former § 63-30-4(3) and 
current § 63-30-4(3)(a), for if the Governmental Immunity Act 
applies even in those circumstances where "the employee acted 
through fraud or malice" the provision of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-4(3) (1990) that the Governmental Immunity Act remedy is 
"exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding . . . unless 
the employee acted through fraud or malice" (emphasis added) is 
read out of the act. If a plaintiff must give notice under the 
Governmental Immunity Act to get a finding of "malice," there is 
then no "exception." 
We therefore have no need to dispute that Lamarr v. Utah 
State Dep't of Transp., 828 P.2d 535, 540-41 (Utah App. 1992) 
holds notice of claim to be jurisdictional, for Lamarr was not a 
case involving claims of fraud/malice. It was an ordinary tort 
claim. There was, and is, no exception for ordinary torts. 
Malice is not something the State is liable for. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-37(2)(b) (1993). It is not within the scope of 
an employee's duties or within the course of his employment and 
therefore not "under color of authority." That, we submit, is the 
reason for the "exception." Two separate judges have found 
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Gurley's conduct the product of actual malice, in three (3) 
separate orders. 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988) ("Borthick II") 
relied upon at Slip Op. 9, plainly did not hold that "complying 
with the notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act is a 
jurisdictional requirement and a precondition to suit." To the 
contrary, Justice Zimmerman categorically held at 769 P.2d 251 that 
The Commissioners7 argument [viz., that "in 
all suits against employees" the requirement of 
a notice of claim is a precondition to suit] 
runs directly counter to section 63-30-11's 
apparently plain statement to the opposite 
effect: "[S]ervice of the notice of claim upon 
the governmental entity is required only if 
the entity has a statutory duty to indemnify 
such person." 
Justice Zimmerman further observed at 769 P.2d 249 n.6, while 
construing the version of the Act in effect in 1990, that Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-11 "also carries the negative implication . . . 
that service of notice on an employee 'is not a condition 
precedent to the commencement of an action . . . against such 
person.," 
Borthick II reaffirmed and relied upon Madsen v. Borthick, 
658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983) (Borthick I), which held at 630n.5 and 
633, precise to the issue herein, that the Governmental Immunity 
Act grants "permission to sue government employees for 'gross 
negligence, fraud or malice.7" Thus Borthick I and II both 
hold, consistent with our reading of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(3) 
(1990), that an employee may be sued, without the necessity of 
filing a notice of claim, in cases of fraud or malice. If there 
could be any doubt, Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838 
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(Utah 1990) (contract action) held, contrary to the conclusion at 
Slip Op. 9, that "the immunity is not absolute" because "the Act 
was structured such that immunity was granted generally and 
waived (and retained by exception to waiver) specifically." 
(Emphasis by the Court.) 
Point IV 
APPEAL WAS DEFECTIVE AND THIS COURT IS WITHOUT 
JURISDICTION, APPEAL NOT HAVING BEEN TAKEN 
FROM ANY "FINAL JUDGMENT" 
If rehearing (reconsideration) is granted, and the foregoing 
errors corrected, there is no need to consider the merits of 
Gurley's appeal for this Court has already ruled that appeal from 
the modification or amendment of the final judgment was of no 
effect. (Slip Op. 4.) 
Reasoning at Slip Op. 5 that Gurley's premature Notice of 
Appeal may be "consider[ed] . . . to have been filed as of January 
7, 1993" under provisions of Rule 4(c), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, fails to cure the jurisdictional defect. Rule 3(d), 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure cited and discussed at Brief of 
Appellant pp. 14-15 provides: 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of 
appeal . . . shall designate the judgment or 
order, or part thereof, appealed from . . . . 
The premature Notice of Appeal, a copy of which is attached, 
designates only the Memorandum Decision of Judge Young dated 
December 18, 1992, and orders preceding it. It reads: 
Notice is hereby given that the defendant and 
appellant Dale Gurley . . . appeals to the Utah 
Supreme Court the final judgment of the Honorable 
David S. Young entered in this matter on 
December 18, 1992. 
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The appeal is taken from the entire judgment 
entered on December 18, 1992, as well as from 
all prior judgments . . . . (Emphasis added.) 
"[W]here the appeal is taken specifically from one part of the 
judgment the appellate court has no jurisdiction to review the 
portion not appealed from." Donovan v. Esso Shipping Co., 259 
F.2d 65, 68 (3d Cir. 1958) "The provision [in Rule 3(d)] consti-
tutes a mandatory requirement and the jurisdiction of this court 
on appeal is limited to the review of the judgment or portion 
thereof designated." Scaramucci v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 
427 F.2d 1309, 1318 (10th Cir. 1970), quoting from Gannon v. 
American Airlines, 251 F.2d 476, 482 (10th Cir. 1958). Accord., 
Whitehead v. American Surety and Trust Co., 285 F.2d 282, 286 
(D.C. Cir. 1961). Rule 4(c) applies when the correct order is 
appealed from, but notice is filed before the order is entered. 
Gurley's counsel frankly acknowledged to Mr. Geoffrey J. 
Butler, Clerk of the Supreme Court, in his letter of January 20, 
1993, a copy of which is attached, that his first Notice of Appeal 
was not from an appealable order and that "a new notice of appeal 
need[s] to be filed." This case is thus unlike the line of cases 
involving an inartful designation of the order appealed from. 
Gurley's counsel was clear, if anything could be clear, that he 
did not intend to appeal from the January 7, 1993 final judgment. 
His intention, plainly declared, was to appeal from the January 27, 
1993 amendment. This Court held, correctly, at Slip Op. 4 that 
"the modification or amendment was purely clerical in nature" and 
"did not create a new judgment for purposes of the timeliness of 
appeal." 
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At the time of counsel's letter to Mr. Butler there were 
seventeen (17) days remaining on Gurley's appeal time, and it 
could have been extended for an additional thirty days if more 
time was needed. The premature notice was abandoned and never 
perfected by filing a docketing statement. Gurley and his counsel 
simply gambled that the clerical amendment of January 27, 1993, 
would be appealable, evidently without looking at the law on the 
subject. Had counsel done so, the authorities cited at Slip Op. 4 
would surely have been found. 
Premature notice of appeal is ineffective to confer appellate 
jurisdiction. DeBry v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co., 
828 P.2d 520 (Utah App., March 18, 1992) (notice of appeal filed 
before disposition of a post-judgment motion). The remedy for 
appeal from a proceeding which is not final is dismissal. A.J. 
Mackey Co. v. Okland Constr. Co., 817 P.2d 323 (Utah 1991). 
This case is functionally identical with Allen v. Schnuckle, 
253 F.2d 195, 196 (9th Cir. 1958), where the final judgment was 
entered on October 30, 1956, but "appellants took two appeals — 
one from an order said to have been entered on February 18, 1957, 
and one from a judgment said to have been entered on February 18, 
1957." The Ninth Circuit ruled appeal from the latter orders 
defective because "[t]he notice of appeal did not mention or refer 
to the judgment of October 30, 1056." Accord., Lindsey v. 
Perini, 409 F.2d 1341, 1342 (6th Cir. 1969) (Per Curiam). 
C O N C L U S I O N 
For the foregoing reasons, rehearing should be granted. Notice 
of Appeal herein was defective and this appeal should be dismissed. 
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ORME, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Dale Gurley, an employee of the State of Utah, appeals the 
trial court's judgment in favor of Parker M. Nielson. We vacate 
the judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
FACTS 
Nielson trains hunting dogs as a hobby. To facilitate his 
hobby, Nielson obtained a permit from the Utah Division of 
Wildlife Resources (DWR) and negotiated a special use lease 
agreement with the State of Utah, Division of State Lands and 
Forestry, for the purpose of "releasing and propagating gamebirds 
for hunting dog training." During the morning of September 8, 
1990, Nielson was training his dogs on the leased property with 
chukar partridges. Nielson completed his activities and left the 
area around 10:00 a.m. 
On the same day, Gurley, a wildlife conservation officer 
employed by DWR, was patrolling in the area of Nielson's 
leasehold, checking on hunters on the opening weekend of the 
hunting season for grouse, chukar, and cottontail rabbit. That 
afternoon, Gurley forcibly entered a locked bird pen belonging to 
Nielson. The pen was part of Nielson's licensed game farm. As a 
result of Gurley's conductf the chukar within the pen escaped. 
Gurley then dismantled a device designed to recapture gamebirds 
and rendered the pen unusable. Gurley also confiscated bird 
feed, feeders, identification bands, and watering devices. 
Gurley did not secure a warrant and did not make an arrest or 
issue a citation. 
On September 18, 1990, a mere ten days after the incident, 
Nielson, a licensed attorney, filed a complaint alleging that 
Gurley converted his property, tortiously interfered with his 
contract with the State, and defamed him.1 Upon being served, 
Gurley prepared a report of the incident and fabricated a 
citation against Nielson, later falsely claiming in his affidavit 
in opposition to Nielson's motion for partial summary judgment 
that he mailed the citation to Nielson. Gurley admitted at trial 
that he had not actually issued a citation to Nielson, nor had he 
ever intended to do so. 
On April 9, 1991, Nielson filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment. The trial court granted the motion, holding that 
Gurley had acted without probable cause and that his conduct was 
unlawful. The trial court also granted Nielson's motion to 
strike Gurley's affidavit because it was "riddled with untruths." 
Subsequently, Nielson filed a second action against Gurley. 
The two actions were consolidated, as both involved the same 
parties, the same transaction, the same damages, and identical 
allegations, except that the second complaint sought an 
injunction to prevent defendant from interfering with plaintiff's 
dog-training activities. The cases proceeded to trial, after 
which the court entered judgment against Gurley for $2300, found 
to be the replacement value of Nielson's property, plus $15,000 
in attorney fees pursuant to Utah's bad faith statute. See Utah 
Code Ann. S 78-27-56(1) (1992). 
Gurley asks us to reverse the trial court's ruling on 
numerous grounds, including lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
governmental immunity, misinterpretation of Utah Wildlife 
statutes and regulations, improper entry of summary judgment, 
improper award of attorney fees to a pro se litigant, and 
improper award of bad faith attorney fees.2 
1. Nielson did not pursue the defamation claim at trial. 
2. Because we hold that the trial court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over this dispute, we do not reach the other issues 
Gurley raises on appeal. 
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TIMELINESS OF APPEAL 
Before reaching the merits of Gurley's appeal, we must first 
determine whether we have jurisdiction over the appeal. Nielson 
argues that Gurley failed to file notice of appeal within thirty 
days following the trial court's entry of final judgment, and 
that we must therefore dismiss this appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a). 
Of course, we cannot take jurisdiction over an untimely 
appeal. Nelson v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390F 392 (Utah 1983). In 
fact, •• [w]hen a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction it 
retains only the authority to dismiss the action." Varian-Eimac. 
Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569f 570 (Utah App. 1989). Howeverf 
w[t]he right to an appeal is a valuable and constitutional right 
and ought not to be denied except where it is clear the right has 
been lost or abandoned.M Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 60, 
185 P.2d 264, 268 (1947). 
The chronology of the proceedings below is critical in 
determining whether we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. On 
June 24, 1991, the trial court entered partial summary judgment 
in favor of plaintiff on the issue of liability. On October 21 
and 22, 1992, trial was held on the remaining issues of 
conversion, interference with contract, and damages. On December 
18, 1992, the trial court, by memorandum decision, awarded 
plaintiff $2300 in damages and $15,000 for attorney fees pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1) (1992). On the same day, by 
minute entry, the trial court indicated it would ,fretain 
jurisdiction over this matter until the final documents resolving 
this case are in place." 
Apparently unclear as to whether the memorandum decision 
constituted a final judgment—a peculiar worry in view of the 
explicit language of the minute entry—Gurley filed a notice of 
appeal from the memorandum decision on December 21, 1992. On 
January 7, 1993, the trial court entered judgment awarding 
plaintiff $2300 in damages and $15,000 in attorney fees. On 
January 27, the trial court amended the judgment to recite that 
Nielson was also entitled to his costs. Gurley filed a second 
notice of appeal, from the amended judgment, on February 26, 
1993. Thus, the notice of appeal Gurley filed on February 26, 
1993, was filed within thirty days from the date the court 
entered the amended judgment, but was not filed within thirty 
days from the date of the original judgment. Therefore, the 
first question presented by Nielson's motion to dismiss is 
whether the thirty-day period for Gurley to file his notice of 
appeal began running as of the date the court entered the 
original judgment or as of the date the court amended the 
judgment. 
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In Utah, the rule of law governing this issue is clear: 
[W]here a belated entry merely constitutes an 
amendment or modification not changing the 
substance or character of the judgment, such 
entry is merely a nunc pro tunc entry which 
relates back to the time the original 
judgment was entered, and does not enlarge 
the time for appeal; but where the 
modification or amendment is in some material 
matter, the time begins to run from the time 
of the modification or amendment. 
Adamson, 185 P.2d at 268. Accord In re Marriage of Mullinax. 639 
P.2d 628, 633-34 (Or. 1982). See also Federal Trade Comm'n v. 
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.. 344 U.S. 206, 211-212, 73 S. 
Ct. 245, 248-49 (1952) (fact that Court amends judgment in 
immaterial way does not extend time within which appellant can 
seek review); CS. Patrinelis, Annotation, Amendment of Judgment 
as Affecting Time for Taking or Prosecuting Appellate Review 
Proceedings, 21 A.L.R. 2d 285, 287, 295-304 (1952) (summarizing 
cases addressing calculation of time for appeal based on whether 
amendment to judgment was material or simply clerical). 
In the instant case, the modification or amendment was 
purely clerical in nature. The trial court did not enlarge the 
award of attorney fees; instead, the court merely clarified its 
order by indicating that Nielson was entitled to his taxable 
costs in addition to the $15,000 attorney fee award. This 
amendment was not of sufficient importance to change the 
character of the judgment. It did not affect any substantive 
rights running to the litigants. Indeed, the court's amendment 
to the judgment was completely unnecessary because costs are 
awarded as a matter of course to the prevailing party unless the 
court otherwise orders. Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). The effect of 
the amendment did not create a new judgment for purposes of 
determining the timeliness of appeal, and the time in which 
Gurley could appeal commenced to run from the date of the 
original judgment.3 
We next consider whether Gurley timely filed notice of 
appeal from the trial court's original judgment. The trial court 
issued its memorandum decision on December 18, 1992. On December 
3. Even if we are incorrect, and the appeal time runs from entry 
of the amended judgment, we would still have jurisdiction over 
this appeal because Gurley filed a notice of appeal within thirty 
days from entry of the amended judgment. 
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21, 1992, Guriey premarureiy rnea nis rirsi: notice of appeal. 
The trial court entered judgment on January 7, 1993. Thus, 
Gurley filed a notice of appeal after the trial court announced 
its decision, but prior to the court's entry of judgment. Rule 
4(c) anticipates just such a scenario and states that 
[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (b) of this 
rule, a notice of appeal filed after the 
announcement of a decision, judgment, or 
order but before the entry of the judgment or 
order of the trial court shall be treated as 
filed after such entry and on the day 
thereof. 
Utah R. App. P. 4(c). Therefore, under Rule 4(c), we consider 
Gurley's notice of appeal to have been filed as of January 7, 
1993—the date the court entered its judgment—unless the case is 
governed by the exception set forth in Rule 4(b). 
Rule 4(b) states: 
If a timely motion under the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court 
by any party (1) for judgment under Rule 
50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make 
additional findings of fact, whether or not 
an alteration of the judgment would be 
required if the motion is granted; (3) under 
Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; 
or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the 
time for appeal for all parties shall run 
from the entry of the order denying a new 
trial or granting or denying any other such 
motion. . . . A notice of appeal filed 
before the disposition of any of the above 
motions shall have no effect. A new notice 
of appeal must be filed within the prescribed 
time measured from the entry of the order of 
the trial court disposing of the motion as 
provided above. 
Utah R. App. P. 4(b) (emphasis added). 
In the instant case, by motion served on January 21, 1993, 
Gurley sought to set aside the judgment entered on January 7, 
1993, and the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained 
therein. However, Gurley's motion did not trigger the exception 
to Rule 4(c) provided for in Rule 4(b). First, Gurley's motion 
was not timely, as he served it more than ten days after the 
court entered judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59(e). Second, 
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Gurley withdrew his motion to set aside on February 26, 1993, and 
thus the court neither granted nor denied his motion and did not 
enter an order which, under Rule 4(b), would trigger a new 
thirty-day appeal time. 
For the foregoing reasons, we have jurisdiction over this 
appeal. 
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
Gurley contends that the trial court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over this case because Nielson failed to comply with 
the notice provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11, -12 (1993). Nielson counters Gurley's 
assertion with a three-prong argument. First, Nielson contends 
that his action against Gurley did not invoke the requirements of 
the Governmental Immunity Act because Nielson accused Gurley of 
wrongdoing in his individual capacity, as opposed to suing him 
for actions taken within the scope of his State employment. (In 
the vernacular employed at oral argument, Nielson contends this 
is routine litigation between "ordinary guys.") Second, Nielson 
contends that whatever immunity Gurley otherwise would have has 
been waived. Finally, Nielson argues that even if the 
Governmental Immunity Act applies to this action, he fully 
complied with the notice provisions necessary to maintain his 
action. 
A. Action Under Color of Authority 
Obviously, a plaintiff can sue a State employee acting in 
his or her individual capacity without implicating the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. State employees, like other citizens, 
engage in a myriad of personal and off-duty activities for which 
they, like other citizens, may be subject to suit. The Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act recognizes this fact and only applies 
to an action against a state employee "for an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope 
of employment, or under color of authority." Utah Code Ann. 
SS 63-30-11(2), -12 (1993). 
However, in the instant case, it is clear that the conduct 
of which Nielson complains was conduct that Gurley engaged in 
while performing his duties as a State employee and was done 
under the color of that authority. Nielson based his original 
complaint against Gurley on allegations that Gurley failed to 
comply with regulations pertaining to "[a]ny peace officer or 
special function officer." Moreover, in his answer to the 
complaint filed on October 2, 1990, Gurley raised governmental 
immunity in several affirmative defenses, invoking numerous 
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statutory provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act, including 
those provisions that require a plaintiff to provide proper 
notice. Therefore, Nielson was aware, even from the initial 
stages of this litigation,4 that Gurley claimed to have seized 
his property under color of the State's authority. Given this 
knowledge, Nielson will not now be heard to complain that the 
Governmental Immunity Act does not apply because Nielson only 
meant to sue Gurley as an ordinary individual, not for anything 
he did in the course of his employment by the State. 
B. Notice a Precondition to Maintaining Action 
The failure to comply with the notice requirements of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act deprives the trial court of 
subject matter jurisdiction, and therefore compliance with the 
act is a precondition to maintaining an action "against the 
state, or against its employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of his duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority." Utah Code Ann. § 63-
30-12 (1993). See j^. S 63-30-11; Lamarr v. Utah State Deo't of 
Transp.. 828 P.2d 535, 540-41 (Utah App. 1992). In Lamarrr we 
held that a suit against the State cannot be maintained unless 
proper notice is given. 828 P.2d at 542. Moreover, we pointed 
out that because improper notice divests the court of subject 
matter jurisdiction, failure to provide proper notice of claim is 
a non-waivable defense that any party, or the court, can raise at 
any time. J&. at 540. 
Nielson, like the plaintiff in Lamarr. claims the notice 
issue is not properly before this court. However, in Lamarr we 
4. Such awareness became increasingly unavoidable as the action 
progressed. On April 22, 1991, Gurley filed an affidavit 
expressly stating that he dismantled the bird pen pursuant to his 
authority as a law enforcement officer. Moreover, Gurley 
attached a citation to his affidavit alleging Nielson violated 
laws and regulations pertaining to the taking, possession, and 
releasing of wild game birds. Although Gurley's affidavit was 
stricken from the record as being "riddled with untruths," it did 
serve to put Nielson on actual notice that Gurley claimed to have 
acted as a state employee. Indeed, when Nielson filed yet a 
third action, one alleging civil rights violations that was later 
removed to federal court, he expressly recognized that H[t]he 
conduct of . . . Gurley was performed under color of various 
statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs or usages of the State 
of Utah." Therefore, Nielson's claim that he sued Gurley in his 
individual capacity, as an ordinary citizen, and was unaware that 
Gurley acted as a wildlife enforcement officer, is untenable. 
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rejected the plaintiff's argument that a state subdivision had 
waived compliance with the notice provisions of the Governmental 
Immunity Act, We expressly stated: 
Lamarr asserts the notice issue is an 
affirmative defense that was not pleaded in 
the answer, and thus Rule 8(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure precludes UDOT from 
raising it in its summary judgment motion and 
on appeal. Lamarr notes UDOT never mentions 
the term "notice of claim" in its answer. He 
further argues UDOT did not request the court 
to rule on this issue on summary judgment and 
therefore we cannot consider it on appeal. 
Lamarr's argument, however, misconstrues the 
nature of the statutory notice of claim 
requirement. Lamarr erroneously asserts the 
notice of claim provision is a statute of 
limitation. Rather, the supreme court has 
held the statutory notice requirement is a 
jurisdictional requirement and a precondition 
to suit. See Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 
245, 250 (Utah 1988). 
Lamarr, 828 P.2d at 540 (emphasis added). Accordingly, this part 
of Nielson's waiver argument fails. 
Nielson further contends that under the substantive 
provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act, the sovereign has 
waived Gurley's immunity. Nielson points to two provisions in 
the Governmental Immunity Act that he claims divest Gurley of 
immunity from suit. Section 63-30-5 states: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived as to any contractual 
obligation. Actions arising out of 
contractual rights or obligations shall not 
be subject to the requirements of [various 
provisions, including the notice 
requirement]. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5(1) (1993) (emphasis added). Nielson 
contends that his claims against Gurley arose out of two 
contracts with the State—his lease with the State and his permit 
to operate his dog-training activities. Therefore, Nielson 
argues that he did not need to provide notice of claim in order 
to maintain his action. 
However, Nielson ignores the operative language of the 
statute that he claims negates the requirement to provide notice. 
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While the statutes that extend sovereign immunity include both 
entities and individual state employees, see Utah Code Ann. § 63-
30-11(2), -12 (1993); section 63-30-5 waives the notice 
requirements and substantive immunity for claims arising from 
"any contractual obligation" only as concerns "all governmental 
entities." Section 63-30-5 does not waive the notice 
requirements for a suit against a state employee "for any act or 
omission occurring during the performance of his duties, within 
the scope of employment, or under color of authority," Utah Code 
Ann. SS 63-30-11(2), -12 (1993), notwithstanding a nexus between 
the claim asserted and "any contractual obligation." Thus, the 
waiver of immunity applicable to contract claims is not 
applicable to Nielson's action against Gurley. 
Finally, Nielson contends that the Governmental Immunity Act 
does not apply because Gurley acted with malice and thus the 
sovereign has waived Gurley's immunity. It is true that if the 
employee acted or failed to act through malice or fraud, the 
employee cannot successfully invoke governmental immunity as an 
affirmative defense. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(3)(b) (1993). 
However, Nielson confuses the scope of the notice requirement 
with the extent of substantive sovereign immunity protection. 
Complying with the notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity 
Act is a Jurisdictional requirement and a precondition to suit, 
and is in no way co-extensive with the substantive provisions 
contained within the Governmental Immunity Act which insulate the 
sovereign and its operatives from liability. See Madsen v. 
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 250 (Utah 1988); Lamarr. 828 P.2d at 540-
41. If, as Nielson argues, a plaintiff need only provide notice 
in those situations when the sovereign may properly invoke 
immunity under the substantive provisions of the Act, the notice 
requirement would be meaningless3 because the substantive 
provisions of sovereign immunity would fully protect the 
sovereign and its operatives in any event. 
We conclude that Gurley's immunity was not waived and that 
Nielson had to comply with the notice provisions of the 
Governmental Immunity Act in order to maintain his action against 
Gurley. 
C. Failure to Comply with Notice Provisions 
In order to comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
[a]ny person having a claim for injury 
against a governmental entity, or against an 
employee for an act or omission occurring 
5. We have recently discussed the several purposes the notice 
requirement is intended to serve. See Brittain v. State. 248 
Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 17 (Utah App. 1994). 
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during the performance of his duties, within 
the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority shall file a written notice of 
claim with the entity before maintaining an 
action, regardless of whether or not the 
function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-11(2) (1993) (emphasis added). 
Moreover, Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-12 (1993) provides that 
[a] claim against the state, or against its 
employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of his duties, within 
the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority, is barred unless notice of claim 
is filed with the attorney general and the 
agency concerned within one year after the 
claim arises, or before the expiration of any 
extension of time granted under Section 
63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the 
function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
In the instant case, Nielson/s claim arose on September 8, 
1990, when he discovered Gurley had dismantled and seized his 
property. Nielson filed his first complaint against Gurley on 
September 18, 1990. However, Nielson did not file a notice of 
claim with the Attorney General or the Division of Wildlife 
Resources prior to initiating this legal action. On October 2, 
1990, Gurley answered Nielson7s complaint and, by referring to 
the statutory provisions concerning notice, raised plaintiff's 
failure to comply with those provisions as an affirmative 
defense. On June 24, 1991, the trial court entered partial 
summary judgment against Gurley on the issue of liability. 
Nielson filed a second action against Gurley based on the same 
conduct in September of 1991, almost one year after the cause of 
action arose. The two actions were consolidated on August 13, 
1992. 
On September 3, 1991, within the one-year period prescribed 
by statute, Nielson apparently endeavored to comply with the 
notice requirement by sending a copy of his complaint and notice 
of claim to the Division of Wildlife Resources. However, to 
comply with the notice requirement, Nielson was also required to 
send notice of claim to the Attorney General within the one-year 
period. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1993); Lamarr, 828 P.2d 
at 541. It was not until December, 4, 1991, that Nielson sent 
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notice of claim to the Attorney General.6 The notice was 
deficient, however, in that it came more than one year after the 
claim arose, and such deficiency was fatal to the trial court's 
jurisdiction. £S£, eTqf , Richards v. Leavitt. 716 P.2d 276, 277 
(Utah 1985) (per curiam); Sears v. Southworth. 563 P.2d 192, 194 
(Utah 1977). 
CONCLUSION 
We have jurisdiction of Gurley's appeal. We conclude that 
Nielson's failure to provide timely notice of claim as required 
by Utah Code Ann SS 63-30-11, -12 (1993) deprived the trial court 
of subject matter jurisdiction over Nielson's claims against 
Gurley. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
6. Nielson contends that he complied with the notice 
requirements by serving notice of claim on both the Attorney 
General and the DWR within the one-year period. However, the 
record does not support Nielson's claim. In order to have 
complied with the notice requirements, Nielson must have filed 
two notices of claim—one with the agency concerned and the 
second with the Attorney General—by September 8, 1991. See 
generally Brittain v. State, 248 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah App. 
1994). While the record does indicate that Nielson timely served 
notice of claim on Gurley and DWR, the record is devoid of proof 
of service of any timely pre-suit notice on the Attorney General. 
Nielson claims he sent a copy of the proposed complaint to the 
Attorney General on August 14, 1991. However, Nielson can point 
to nothing in the record to support this claim and readily admits 
that the December 4, 1991, notice he sent to the Attorney General 
was done because he "anticipated] that the . . . first and 
second notices were defective." 
930327-CA 11 
DENNIS J. i _ o_,^ * ) 
TODY K BURNETT Ar'* Q -
WILLIAMS i HL^ 
257 Ease 200 Soucr*, - . 
Pest Office Box 4 56 7?-
SalL La*e .:r Jt an ^414l.-5678 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR TOOELE COUNTY 
STATU OK UTAH 
PARKER M. NIELSON, : 
: NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Plaintiff, : 
i r : 
: C I v i 1 No. 9 0 - 03 00 - 3 0 2 
DALE GURLEY, : and 
: " "iv J, I No , "1- i j "IIMI ,,"'1 "." 
D e f e n d a n t . : 
Mctt 'ice i s h e r e b y q i v e n t tu t . d e f e n d a n t a n d a p p e l l a n t D a l e 
G u r l e y t h r o u g h c o u n s e l , bui i tu i *-»nju..i u n | tlit» law ! MI in i 
W i l l i a m s & Hunt a p p e a l s t o t h e U t a h S u p r e m e C o u r t t h e f i i i . tJ 
i o . f o u n g e n t e r e d , xn K.U±& m a t t e r 
: D e c e n i t -
The a p n e a : . * - - . -.<- - r. : * . -i.jrv M - :t-. r t "  i 
, - , - , , - - , . ^erj ^ n 
- ^ * * £• * • - - * > - , 111 MI 1 y 
. ^ ; ; : t e n c , - - t - r ' * - i h a i n t ; : : , n* ..4 I t~ i\ w e l l 
• '
, t :fa* a l t e r e d i ^ " i * - •* 
j -• *- »• ' i- - - * * •* , - - ~* ^ n 3 w a « j i- ,i 
s a n e - i o n . . ^ i ^ - . . do t
 Jr.» - i r ^ m ' .• * i ^ - - ; - . a l o f 
defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Motion for Relief from Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for 
Relief from Order. 
DATED this ^A day of December, 1992. 
WILl/lAMS St HUNT 
b y . AAA 
Denn i s C. F e r g u s o n 
A t t o r n e y s f o r Defendah t 
#17669 
2 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY 0F S A 1 ,«T 1 , A KE 
ss . 
H e a t h e i: B a r n e y,, b e i n g d u 1 y sworn, says 11: i a t s h e i s e i i i p 1 o} E: d 
i n 11 I e 1 a w o £ f I c e s o f W i 1 1 1 a m s & H u n t, a. 11 o r n e y s £ o r D e f e n d a n t: 
herein; that she served the attached Noti ce of Appeal in Civil 
Nos . 90-0300 3-02 and 91 0300 249 before the Third District Coin: t 
for "Tooe 1 e County, i ipoi I t:he par ties 1 isted be 1 ow by p 1 aci ng a 
t rue and correct copy t he re o f :i i I a.n e nve ] op e addr e s s e d t o : 
Da.n ie 1 D , Darger 
32 Exchange Place, Suite #100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Parker M. Nielsen 
65 5 South 200 E:uh 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and i ausxny I he Sdin^ " 1 
Hay f if Pecemher ] '9 
Ml i I I ' *(1 , | H \y t I JM PI' epri } 1 I I £1 5f 
(I... jJR I ^
 f / $u ^M . \ 
Rpather Barney 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me tins 
December, 1992. 
day cf 
Notary Public 
ERIK C. HACKING 
} 
zff&S&^cA 257 East 200 South # 5Cn ] 
\ [ rr<£ZW P Salt Lake City, Utah 84 i n . 
V^Sfcr/S.'/' My Commission Expire- 1 
W&tary Public 
Residing in the ate of Utah 
#72705. STlfl, 
August 28, 1995 
St2tecf U:?h 
I \W OFFICES OF 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
1 r EAST 20<J bOL M • -'• '< • 0 
P O BOX 4nw< 
S-\l i i \K- e r - i 'TV- H4 i 
ENNISC FERGUSON 
Januai\ 20. 1093 
c ^ - DUI * Hand Delivered 
supreme Cour ' M 
State of Utah 
vx
-l Mate Capitol 
.^ alt ; .LKL- Ciu. rTtah Q^1 1" 
.NlClSQIl v • u u i n . 
Civi] \Tm o^nsot- ,1(190(1300302 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
rnl
~arV vr-T] for your letter of January ; v ,..i<j IUI uiseussing wmi : u 
toda> Jie status of the Notice of Appeal uhicn I wx^ni on behalf of Dale Gurle\ 
1
""^" : > briefly review the procedural status o) this case, which will serve t< expiaai 
Vviiy we ;iave nor proceeded further at this time with uie filing oi - iuckem.^ 
statement. 
~ December 18, 1992, the trial court entered its Memorandum •. . . 
rop\ H which I attach hereto. At the time I received the Memorandum Lx..isum 
J not ascertain from the pleading itself whether the Court intended it to constitute 
u.> A-hidings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment. In order to protect my 
client's interest, I filed a Notice of Appeal on December1 21, 19u.! 
I :iU\) if A- NVfk. ^ Appeal nor only to comply with the uany -day requirement 
but also heeuuM. I tiled at die same time a Motion for Supersedeas Relief, asking the 
trial court to stay execr" ' ^ t!v ivsiv -^--:-- -ending appeal At the same; time I filed 
the requisite security, 
Aftei r Notici <•: -\ipcji v\ : "led. ndgc Y amg entered a Minute Entn' 
directing that .-* i.u', .. „;.M . prepare Finding,- %( 1 act. Conclusions of 1 aw AI . a 
Judgment vibmit these pleadings to me foi approval and then to the Cour v-r e: \ 
Based upon the trial court's subsequent action, it is now clear that he did * 
his Memorandum Decision to constitute the final order in this matter. 
TELEPHONE (801) 521-5678 
FAX (801) 364-4500 
Geoffrey J. Butler - 2 - January 20, 1993 
To date, the trial court has not entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment. Thus, the order currently appealed from is not final. 
As I read Rule 4(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the notice of appeal in 
this case will be treated as filed after the entry of the Judgment "and on the day 
thereof". 
However, in the event that post-trial motions are filed pursuant to Rule 50(b), 
Rule 52(b) or Rule 59, the current Notice of Appeal would have no effect. Rule 4(b) 
provides that "a notice of appeal filed before the disposition of any [such] motions 
shall have no effect" and requires a new notice of appeal to be filed "within the 
prescribed time measured from the entry of the order of the trial court disposing of 
[such a] motion". 
Because a final judgment has not been entered and, theoretically at least, 
motions under Rules 50, 52 or 59 could be filed after entry of such judgment, it is 
impossible to know at this point whether the current Notice of Appeal will be effective 
under Rule 4(c) or whether a new notice of appeal will need to be filed as provided by 
Rule 4(b). For this reason, I respectfully ask that the Court hold this appeal in 
abeyance until further action has been taken by the trial court. I will keep the 
Supreme Court notified of the status of the case. 
If for any reason you believe the procedure I have suggested is not appropriate, 
I would appreciate your so advising. Thank you. 
Very truly yours, 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
DCF:hb 
enclosures 
cc: Daniel Darger 
Parker M. Nielson 
James R. Soper 
